Here again, Frege uses the identity sign to help state the material equivalence of two concepts. This means it allows quantification over functions as well as quantification over objects; i. In particular, we adopt the following conventions.
Theory of Sense and Reference Gottlob Frege 2. What treatment of identity statements will explain the difference?
Frege favors 2 identity is a relation between names or signs. The difference is unaccountable if identity is a relation between objects since both statements alike would only record the fact that some thing is the same as itself. It seems that something is learned from an identity statement because it is learned through the difference of the two names, hence, what the statement really tells us about is a relation between names.
The Problem having the informative aspect solely: Exception to this regular connexion 1. To a sense, there may not be a corresponding reference: Si duo idem faciunt, non est idem If two persons picture the same thing, each still has its own idea.
Difference in sense but not reference 3. Difference in reference Conclusion: A proper name word, sign, sign combination, expression expresses its sense, stands for or designates its reference.
By means of a sign we express its sense and designate its reference.Friedrich Ludwig Gottlob Frege (b. , d. ) was a German mathematician, logician, and philosopher who worked at the University of Jena. (names and descriptions) in the sentence.
One puzzle concerned identity statements and the other concerned sentences with subordinate clauses such as propositional attitude reports. . Friedrich Ludwig Gottlob Frege (b.
, d. ) was a German mathematician, logician, and philosopher who worked at the University of Jena. Frege essentially reconceived the discipline of logic by constructing a formal system which, in effect, constituted the first ‘predicate calculus’. Outline and Assess Frege's two solutions to Frege's Puzzle During the course of this essay I intend to explicate Frege's puzzle regarding the semantics of identical proper names as .
In modern times, Frege's insight has been defended with elaborate modal logical arguments, beginning with Barcan in , using Leibniz's Law about identity and indiscernibility, that seem to suggest that for any a and b, if a = b (even contingently), then necessarily a = b.
Frege's puzzles are puzzles about the semantics of proper names, although related puzzles also arise in the case of indexicals. Gottlob Frege (–) introduced the puzzle at the beginning of his article "Über Sinn und Bedeutung" (" On Sense and Reference ") in in one of the most influential articles in analytic philosophy and.
Informative Identities in the Begriffsschrift and ‘On Sense and Reference’ This paper is about the relationship between Frege’s discussions of informative identity statements in the Begriffsschrift and ‘On Sense and Reference’.
The question of 2 Gottlob Frege, ‘On Sense and Meaning’.